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The Frolova Case: A Practitioner=s View, by Anthony D=Amato*,
1 New York Law School Human Rights Annual, 33-50 (1983)
Abstract: The Frolova case may provide a substantial basis for continuing a trend away from the unfortunate decision
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino which may some day be viewed as the Alast gasp@ of the act of state doctrine as
an impediment to the realization of the international rule of law.
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[pg33]**The Frolova case came my way obliquely. In the spring of 1982 my former
student Susan Keegan, a practicing lawyer in Chicago, called me at home in the evening on
behalf of her friend, Lois Frolova, who needed practical advice on how to handle a press
conference the next morning. Susan said that Lois had just begun a total hunger strike in
sympathy with that of her husband Andrei Frolova who had begun his hunger strike in Moscow
and resolved to continue it Ato the death if necessary.@ The problem was that the Soviet Union
would not let Andrei out of the country to join his wife Lois in Chicago.
I had a long talk with Susan and then, later that same evening, with Lois. I knew very
little about the Adivided families@ issue in the developing international law of human rights other
than what I had read in the newspapers regarding Soviet Jewry wishing to emigrate. Lois=s
situation did not fit that latter category; although she is Jewish, Andrei is not, and their problem
was neither religious nor ethnic.
But why wouldn=t the Soviet Union give Andrei an exit visa? Lois could not satisfactorily
answer this question. To be sure, she gave various Aanswers@—Soviet intransigence, the cold
war, bureaucratic obduracy, jealously on the part of minor Soviet officials who themselves would
like to leave Russia and thus did not want to see any one else leave, and perhaps the fact that
Andrei was a freelance photojournalist by profession. None of these reasons seemed to me to be
particularly important. In his job Andrei had not seen anything regarding national security; his
work was equivalent to photojournalism for our National Geographic Magazine. Yet I persisted
in asking Lois these questions, out of a general lawyer=s caution that there might be more to the
Soviet refusal than met the eye.
Lois=s answers were clear. She met and fell in love with [pg34] Andrei while researching
her dissertation on nineteenth-century Soviet liberalism during a student-exchange trip to
Moscow, and they were married in the spring of 1981 at the Palace of Marriages. A month later
Lois=s visa expired and she was compelled to leave the Soviet Union without her husband. She
saw him again a year later while on a nineteen-day tourist visa.
In preparation for the next days news conference I asked Lois an embarrassing question
that was likely to arise: AIf you love your husband so much that you=re willing to go on a total
hunger strike for him, why don=t you move to the Soviet Union and become a Soviet Union and
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become a Soviet citizen and live with him there?@ Lois replied that Andrei had no close relatives
in the Soviet Union, whereas Lois had her parents (one of whom was recently hospitalized for a
long time) in Chicago. Besides, she added, she simply did not want to live in the Soviet Union,
whereas Andrei was willing to live in the United States. But the best answer to such a question,
we later decided, was the simple truth that Lois did not want to bring up her children as Soviet
citizens.
Then it was Lois=s turn to ask me a question: was she taking a risk in holding a press
conference? Might the Soviets arrest Andrei if she made a big fuss in the United States? Might
he be the victim of an Aaccident@? I hesitated, because we were speculating, after all, about a
human life. Moreover, I was glad that Lois asked me this question, because it indicated that she
had not made up her mind about holding the press conference, and therefore she was genuinely
asking me for advice rather than simply eliciting information from me about how to hold a press
conference. I think the client-attorney relationship between Lois and me in fact began at that
moment.
What do you think they might do?@ I asked Lois, first of all.
AWell,@ she replied, Awhen Andrei requested permission to emigrate to the United States,
they suggested that he first resign from his union, the Committee of Literary Workers. So he
resigned. Then he discovered that he was unemployable because he was not in a union. They
denied him his exit permit, and he no longer was able to get his stories or photographs published.
He was completely out of a job.@
AWho is >they=?@ I asked.
AIn Russia, >they= is usually a man dressed in civilian clothes [pg35] whom citizens can
>spot= just from the way he talks and carries himself. The man tells you something authoritative,
something that he probably would not know unless he were officially connected with the
government. But he never produces any papers and never puts anything in writing. Yet Andrei
can tell when it=s the secret police or a government agent. Once they came to his flat and told
him to go along with them.@
AWhat did he do?@
ANothing. He refused to go along.@
AWhat happened?@
“Nothing. I guess he called their bluff. Or maybe they didn=t want to officially arrest
him.@
Lois continued her account. Andrei was desperate to leave the Soviet Union now that he
was out of a job. He heard of four other persons who had begun a hunger strike to join their
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spouses in the United States and in Western Europe (they were two men and two women). He
agreed with them to join their effort. (A photo later appeared in The New York Times of the
hunger strikers leaning out of an apartment in Moscow, the photo having been taken from the
street below.)
Lois found out about Andrei=s decision to go on a hunger strike from a reporter for the
Chicago Tribune who was stationed in Moscow. (Andrei could not call her; she arranged,
through friends, to call him at specific times, but the telephoning process was laborious.
Recently, the Soviet Union has made it even more difficult for their citizens to engage in
transatlantic phone calls.)
When Lois received the word from the Tribune reporter, she was in the midst of
breakfast. She said, simply, that from then on she could not eat. Her body had made the decision
for her—to engage in a parallel hunger strike. But now she was asking me whether telling the
press about it might endanger Andrei.
AYour husband has already taken the decisive step,@ I replied. AThe Soviets are already
mad at him. If they are going to do anything to him, they already have enough excuse to do it.
Of course, I=m only guessing, but I think that you can only help him by generating publicity here
in Chicago. My guess is that there is a certain safety in a lot of publicity. If he=s in the limelight,
he probably is safer than he would be if you do nothing. I can=t be [pg36] sure of this, and it has
to be your own decision, Lois, but my recommendation would be for you to go ahead with the
press conference.@
Lois agreed. What Andrei had done was out of her hands. Publicity, if anything, might
help ensure his safety. On the other hand, we agreed that it had to be responsible, serious
publicity; a life was at stake.
We agreed to hold the press conference at Northwestern University School of Law. The
law school would be an appropriate place, I thought, both to emphasize the seriousness of the
situation and perhaps to create a favorable precedent for others. To Lois=s great credit,
throughout the ups and downs of the coming weeks, she invariably coupled her case with those
of the many other persons in Soviet Union who were seeking to leave to be reunited with their
spouses or relatives. Lois would have made an ideal law student if she had not decided to pursue
a Ph.D. in history at Stanford. She understood the immediate relevance, as a matter of principle,
of her case to the situations of others whose lives were so devastatingly impacted by the refusal
of a government to allow them to live with their spouses.
The press conference the next morning attracted major media attention, and from then on
Lois was one of the most recognized persons in Chicago. People stopped her on the street to say
that they had seen her on television, or to ask about the latest developments in her situation that
they had heard about on radio or seen in the daily papers. Lois appeared on national television on
an evening program devoted in part to the Adivided families@ issue; Lois was the only spouse in
this country on a parallel hunger strike. She made an enormous impact. At one point she was
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asked what the Department of State was doing in her behalf, and she replied, Athey won=t even
return my phone calls.@ The next morning, at 8 a.m., she was awakened by an apologetic phone
call from the State Department.
Lois consulted Dr. Sheldon Berger, a specialist in food deprivation and reported to him
regularly. It seemed that her hunger strike was contagious. In the next few weeks, I found
myself losing weight! Lois=s mother=s first reaction was, AA hunger strike can be a good thing. If
you must fast, you must fast. Just be sure to eat a little something.@
Lois was certainly getting publicity, but there seemed to be [pg37] no effect upon the
Soviet Union. We began to wonder whether now that we had achieved national publicity the
Soviets would never give in, lest they seem to be caving in simply because of the power of a free
press. And Lois was losing weight rapidly and looking pale. In Moscow, Andrei Frolova and his
fellow hunger-strikers were also weakening physically, and unlike Lois they had no benefit of
medical advice.
Frustrated and unable to sleep, an idea popped into my head about 3 a.m.: why not sue the
Soviet Union? No one had ever sued that nation in a United States court on a human-rights
matter, but why couldn=t there be a first time? But who was the plaintiff? Clear-headed
reflection the next morning led to the conclusion that Lois, and not Andrei, was the plaintiff. The
Soviet Union was harming her directly; it was interfering with her relational interest in living
with her husband. And because of the harm to Lois, the Atort@ was located where Lois was,
namely, in Chicago.
Excited, I asked Lois to come to my office, and I also invited a colleague, Professor
Steven Lubet of the Northwestern Legal Clinic, a specialist in immigration law. Lois was
somewhat flabbergasted at the idea of suing the Soviet Union. Steve was of the opinion that,
regardless of the merits, a lawsuit would probably work to secure added safety to Andrei in the
same way that publicity probably had served to add to his personal safety. Lois was convinced.
She was already doing everything elseCwriting letters to Members of Congress, appearing on
radio and television talks shows, forming (with the help of the Young Republicans) a National
Coalition for Divided Families, and hounding the Office of Human Rights of the State
Department (which she said was singularly unsympathetic to her situation).
Professor Lubet and I went to work immediately on drafting a Complaint. We agreed that
an action for monetary damages might present intractable problems of collection if we got a
judgment, and that the Soviets knew this, but that issue seemed almost irrelevant. Our main
purpose was to bring pressure upon the Soviet Union to let Andrei Frolova emigrate to the
United States. We were working under the shadow of Andrei=s vow to fast to the death, and Lois
had assured us that her husband was a most serious and stubborn Russian.
The first thing I looked up was the Foreign Sovereign [pg38] Immunities Act of
1976.FN1 Congress= intention in that Act was to remove the defense of sovereign immunity
when foreign governments or their instrumentalities were sued in American courts with respect
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to their commercial activities. FN2 Was Lois=s human-rights problem a Acommercial
activity@?FN3 Clearly not.
But there was another provision in the Act relating to torts, intended to handle the
problem of diplomatic immunity. FN4 Under traditional international law, and by virtue of
specific conventions, foreign diplomats are not personally subject to the court jurisdiction of the
host country. FN5 Nevertheless, if they commit a tort, it is reasonable that the countries they
represent be liable for damage caused. Under the 1976 Act, there is no sovereign immunity
defense available to a foreign state for tortious acts attributable to that state committed in the
United States. FN6
Certainly Congress had not contemplated a case such as Lois=s in this Adiplomatic@
section of the Act. Yet the Act speaks of a Atortious act or omission@ of the foreign state or its
agents with the personal injury Aoccurring in the United States.@ FN7 It seemed clear that under
the plain meaning of these terms, the Soviet Union=s tortious act (refusing to let Andrei leave the
country) directly caused harm to Lois (her relational interest) in Chicago. Did Congress intend to
cover such a case? There was no evidence that Congress did not so intend. Congress probably
never thought of the possibility. But Lois=s case seemed clearly to fit within the statute, was not
inconsistent with its purpose, and after all, the very process of legislation is designed to enact
general rules that may encompass future cases that could not [pg39] have been specifically
foreseen by the legislators.
Further research indicated that we might make out a case for the tortious interference with
an internationally protected rightCthe right of persons to live together as a family. We would
attempt to show that, but intentionally depriving the plaintiff of her right to live with her
husband, the defendant had committed a clear violation of international law that is binding on all
nations and enforceable in American courts as Apart of our law.@ FN8
International law, I would argue later in my Memorandum to the court, FN9 consists of
two parts: customary and conventional. Taking up customary law first, customary international
law is binding upon all nations and has been explicitly recognized in an official text of the Soviet
Union as binding upon it. FN10 Customary international law is made up of Arules which have
acquired legal significance as a result of their application by States over a prolonged period.@
FN11 These rules may be Ageneral principles of law recognized by civilized nations@ that have
their origin in treaties or in the constitutions and laws of the nations themselves. FN12
All the civilized nations of the world recognize the right of marriage and the legal status
that marriage confers upon the partners to a marriage. The right of a man and woman to be
married is one of the clearest general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. FN13 The
Soviet Constitution is exemplary:
The family enjoyed the protection of the state. Marriage is based on the free consent of
the woman and the man; the spouses are completely equal in their family relations. FN14
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The right to get married and concomitantly the right to prevent [pg40] the state from interfering
with the marriage has become part of the international law of human rights, enforceable by
individuals (in appropriate forums) against states.FN15 The provisions regarding the right to
marry and found a family contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
Articles 12 & 16 FN16 (subscribed to by the Soviet Union) have passed into customary
international law.FN17
In the present case, the court would not be called upon to determine whether there is a
right of emigration under customary international law. Even so, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, subscribed to by the Soviet Union in 1948, states in Article 13(2): FN18
AEveryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.@
FN19 Thus the combination of Article 13(2) with the clear human right of a family to live
together means that the Soviet Union and/or its officials or employees have violated the law in
intentionally depriving the plaintiff of her right to be with her husband and to found a family.
Of great impact upon the content of the customary international law of human rights was
the Helsinki Accords of 1975,FN20 officially known as the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe.FN21 Adopted by numerous states including the Soviet
Union and the United States, the human rights provisions therein are evidence of an underlying
consensus of the content of customary international law. For example, the Helsinki Accords
explicitly provide that the parties will act in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human
[pg41] Rights. FN22 Part IV contains the following provisions that apply to the plaintiff=s claims
in the present case:
1.(a). Applications for temporary visits to meet members of their families will be dealt
with without distinction as to the country of origin or destination. . . .
1.(b). The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the
applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family . . . . They
will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible.
1.(c). The participating States will examine favorably and on the basis of humanitarian
considerations requests for exit or entry permits from persons who have decided to marry
a citizen from another participating State.
The processing and issuing of the documents required for the above purposes and
for the marriage will be in accordance with the provisions accepted for family
reunification.
In dealing with requests from couples from different participating States, once
married, to enable them and the minor children of their marriage to transfer their
permanent residence to a State in which either one is normally a resident, the participating
States will also apply the provisions accepted for family reunification. FN23
Turning to conventional international law (the law of treaties), it is clear that the illegality
of the acts or omissions of the defendant are clearly established by treaties that the defendant has
ratified.
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The Soviet Union ratified in 1973 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which entered into force in 1976. FN24 (The United States has signed but has not ratified
this treaty, although the objections to the treaty voiced in the United [pg42] States Senate have
not included the provisions relevant to the present case.) The Covenant includes the following
provisions:
Art. 12 (2). Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
Art. 23 (1). The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
to protection by society and the State.
Art. 23 (2). The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a
family shall be recognized. FN25
Thus, as a matter of binding treaty obligation freely accepted by the Soviet Union, the latter has
violated international law in frustrating the plaintiff=s right to live with her husband and to found
a family by denying her husband his right to leave his own country to be with his wife.
Additionally, the defendant has violated the most fundamental treaty in the international
system, the Charter of the United Nations, which provides in Article 55 for the promotion of
Auniversal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. . . .@
FN26 This provision links with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and with the
development in many treaties since that time of the rights of married people to live together to
found a family.
Both customary and conventional international law, therefore, work together and interact
with each other to provide with exceptional clarity the right of married people to live together
and to found a family. This international law, external to the Soviet Union, is binding upon it as
a member state of the international legal system. Reinforcing the binding quality of international
law is the provision of the Soviet Constitution, previously quoted, that Athe family enjoys the
protection of the state.@FN27 The sum total of all these rules is that the defendant and/or its
officials or employees have acted illegally in forcibly barring the plaintiff=s husband from leaving
his country to live with her and to found a family.
Thus, the outline of Lois=s case had become clear: the Soviet [pg43] Union committed an
intentional tort on Lois=s relational interest by unlawfully denying her husband his right to leave
the Soviet Union and join his wife.
In drafting the Complaint and formulating a strategy for the case, two extremely
significant suggestions resulted in important modifications. The first came from Luis Kutner, a
famous human-rights attorney in Chicago. Kutner suggested that we sue the United States as
well as the Soviet Union. The refusal by the State Department to help Lois, established a basis
for Lois to sue the United States for failing to protect her human rights vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. Theoretically, it seemed to me that the idea fused the classical and the modern concepts
of international law. Under the classical concept, an individual does not have Astanding@ to sue a
foreign government; only that individual=s government may act on behalf of the individual. FN28
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Under the modern concept of human rights, there has been a loosening of the Astanding@
requirement (for example, explicitly, in the European Commission of Human Rights).FN29
Along with that loosening is the concept that an individual may sue his own government as well
as a foreign governmentCthe primacy of Ahuman rights@ suggests that no government should be
immune, including one=s own government. Merged, these concepts yield the theory that the
United States owed to Lois a human-rights obligation to sponsor her claim against the Soviet
Union, and thus she had a human-rights claim against the United States for failing to act in her
behalf.
But perhaps even more important than these theoretical concerns was the practical
consequence that suing the United States would surely be the quickest and most effective way to
bring Lois=s case to the attention of senior officials of the Soviet [pg44] Union. We were fighting
against time; Andrei, in his small Moscow flat, was losing weight rapidly. By implicating the
United States in our lawsuit, we might underline the significance and immediacy of Lois=s claim.
And certainly it would not be frivolous to implicate the United States, for the theoretical reasons
given above.
But there was even a better way to implicate the United States than simply to add a
second defendant to the lawsuit. Under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures, it was possible to
bring in the United States as co-plaintiff.FN30 Accordingly, with Lois=s consent, I added the
United States of America as ANecessary Co-Plaintiff,@ under the claim that to the extent under
international law that Lois=s rights w ere enforceable by the United States in its sovereign
capacity the United States should be joined as plaintiff against the Soviet Union. By this tactic,
the United States might find itself in an adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union in a
federal court in Chicago. Surely if the United States found this position unpalatable, the case
would get prominent attention in Washington=s diplomatic circles.
As expected, the United States Attorney resisted being dragged into Lois=s case, and
therefore I had to argue that the United States was an Ainvoluntary co-plaintiff,@ which again was
a permissible position under the Rules of Civil Procedures. FN31
The second significant modification of the complaint came from a suggestion by Susan
Keegan and her senior partner Michael Coffield. They advised me to file for an injunction as
well as going for damages. Although the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 only
provided jurisdiction for cases involving Amoney damages,@ FN32 the Act might be construed as
not explicitly prohibiting injunctions. In my later Memorandum of Law, I contended that Lois=s
case came under the terms of the Act because it was one Ain which money damages are sought
against a foreign state.@ The request for an injunction was in addition to the money damages.
Moreover, I argued that the possibility of an injunction should fairly be implied in the case of a
continuing tort where the threat of money damages may be ineffectual. The [pg45] Act was
passed, after all, in the context of the complete merger in federal courts of law and equity
jurisdiction.
Therefore I added to the Complaint a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, asking the
8

federal district court in Chicago to bar the Soviet Union from engaging in any commercial
transactions in the Northern District of Illinois unless and until Andrei Frolova was allowed to
emigrate to the United States. Since Soviet transactions on the Board of Trade in Chicago in
commodities such as wheat and gold run to the many millions of dollars, there was considerable
Abite@ in the threat of injunction. Indeed, all the Chicago papers and television stations
immediately focused on the possible injunction against wheat purchases and gold sales as soon as
the case was filed. The headline in the Chicago Tribune read, ASuit Seeks to Bar Soviet Dealing
in N. Illinois.@
Lois asked what chance there was that the court would grant the injunction. I told her that
all these legal actions had a very low probability of actual success on their own terms, and not to
get overly enthusiastic about the legal maneuvers. At the same time, how does the Soviet Union
know what a district court judge in Chicago might do? For all they know, they might find
themselves severely interrupted in their major commercial transactionsCand if they are
interrupted once, it could happen against with respect to other cases in the future. They would
thus have to ask themselves whether keeping Andrei Frolova in Moscow was really worth the
chance, at whatever level of probability they might assign to that chance, of such an injunction
being issued against them.
I filed the Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction in federal court on the
morning of May 20, 1982. A few days later I submitted my Memorandum of Law, which dealt
with the basis for jurisdiction. FN33
The Memorandum asserted that under 28 U.S.C. ' 1605(a)(5) of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 the court had jurisdiction over the defendant foreign state because of the
exception to that state=s immunity for
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States
and caused by the [pg46] tortious act or omission of that foreign state. FN34
I cited Letelier v. Republic of Chile, FN35 for the proposition that a foreign state may be
sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for setting in motion a tortious act that
occurred within the United States. In Letelier, the alleged decision to order a political
assassination within the United States occurred within the territory of Chile; nevertheless,
jurisdiction was found under ' 1605(a)(5) since the injury or death occurred within the United
States. FN36 ' 1605(a)(5) excepts from immunity the Aforeign state or . . . any officer or
employee.@ FN37 Clearly the foreign state itself can never be present Ain the United States.@
Hence, I argued, ' 1605(a)(5) necessarily contemplates that the injury complained of occurring in
the United States could have been set in motion—could have been the direct effect of—acts or
omissions of foreign governments in foreign lands. Furthermore, the phrasing of the statute
separates the Ainjury . . . occurring in the United States@ from the rest of the sentence Acaused by
the tortious act or omission of that foreign state@FN38—setting apart conceptually the site of the
injury and the party responsible for the harm.
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I also asserted that the Aact of state@ doctrine did not apply in the Letelier case, and should
not apply in Lois=s case, for two reasons. First, the Aact of state@ doctrine should not allow
sovereign immunity to reenter through the back door when the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act had provided for a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. FN39 Under the traditional Aact
of state@ doctrine American courts were not permitted to sit in judgment of the acts of a foreign
government done within its [pg47] own territory. FN40 However, in the most recent act-of-state
case in the Supreme Court, the Court refused to apply the act of state doctrine once an exception
to sovereign immunity was established saying:
we hold that the mere assertion of sovereignty as a defense to a claim arising out of purely
commercial acts by a foreign sovereign is no more effective if given the label Aact of
state@ than if it is given the label Asovereign immunity.@ FN41
Next I argued that the Aact of state@ doctrine should not apply to Lois=s case because here,
the foreign state=s act violated international law. By establishing that the defendant=s action or
omission in denying Andrei his right to emigrate to the United State to join his wife was illegal,
several logical requirements of the argument in the case were satisfied. First, an illegal act
cannot be Adiscretionary@ and would therefore not come within subsection (A) of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, which provides immunity for Adiscretionary function[s].@ FN42 As
the court stated in Letelier, Athere is no discretion to commit, or to have one=s officers or agents
commit, an illegal act.@ FN43 Second, a showing of illegality established the tortious nature of
the defendant=s act or omission within the Soviet Union resulting in injury to Lois within the
United States. Finally, regarding the traditional fear behind the Aact of states@ doctrine that a
court might be frustrating the foreign-policy objectives of the other branches of the federal
government, there was good language to quote in the Memorandum filed by the United States
Department of State as amicus in the recent case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.FN44 When an
individual has suffered a denial of his human rights as guaranteed by international law, the State
Department brief said,
[pg48] there is little danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy
efforts. To the contrary, a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these
circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our nation=s commitment to the
protection of human rights. FN45
Lois held a second press conference the morning that the case was filed. Dr. Sheldon
Berger stated that, in the eleventh day of her hunger strike, Lois=s weight had dropped from 112
pound to 98 pounds. The Chicago Tribune reporter wrote in his news story that Lois Alooked
weak and wan.@
Service of process against a foreign government is a difficult procedure under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. FN46 Complete translations of all the papers filed in the case and all
the relevant statutes must be provided. It would be a while before we could get all the
translations, which would be prepared by Lois and her friends. However, because I moved for a
preliminary injunction, I notified the Soviet Embassy in Washing D.C. by telegram (both in
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English and in Russian), and sent them as a preliminary matter copies of the Complaint and
Motion by express mail. My guess is that the Soviet officials first received word of the case from
the lawyers in the Department of Justice who had to cope with the possibility that they would be
involved in a lawsuit against the Soviets in Chicago.
In any event, on the fifth day after sending the telegram of notification to the Soviet
Embassy in New York, Andrei Frolova in Moscow was told to go to the passport office. (We
heard word of this through the Chicago Tribune reporter who was keeping regular tabs on Andrei
in Moscow.) When he went there, Athey@ told him that, if he wished, he could re-apply for an
exit visa. They did not indicate to him what the disposition would be, but they assured him that
his re-application would be given Aimmediate consideration.@ I appeared in court on the Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction, and requested a week=s continuance on the ground that there seemed
to be positive developments in Andrei=s situation.
[pg49] Andrei=s re-application was duly processed. Then word was finally given to the
group of hunger strikers in Moscow that Andrei would be given his exit visa. When the others
heard this, they burst into cheers and applause. In Chicago, Lois sat down to a hearty meal.
Nothing was done by the Soviet Union about the four other hunger strikers for two long
months; then, two of them were told they would get their exit papers. Nevertheless, Andrei=s
case must have had a beneficial impact upon the other hunger strikers, for it would have been
tactically unwise of the Soviet Union only to release the person who sued them. That would have
invited many future lawsuits.
At the same time, the Soviet Union would not want to convey the message that going on a
hunger strike was a way to get exit papers. For there are many thousands of Jews, among other
citizens, wishing to emigrate from the Soviet Union. The hunger strike as a tactic therefore must
be officially disavowed. The Soviet Union did nothing for Yuri Balovlenkov, one of the hunger
strikers, and Yuri is alive, has given up his hunger strike, and is still in the Soviet Union without
any present prospects of being allowed to leave.
Andrei Frolova arrived at O=Hare International Airport in Chicago on the bright Sunday
afternoon of June 20, 1982. He was tired and carried with him his entire worldly possessions.
The front pages of the next day=s Chicago papers were headlined, AFrom Russia, With Love.@ In
front of the TV cameras and press representatives on the afternoon of Andrei=s arrival, Lois
Frolova said, AMy joy of this day stands in stark contrast to the other divided families who have
been deprived of their elemental human rights.@ She used the time and TV cameras to name the
individuals still seeking to emigrate from the Soviet Union, and described their individual
situations briefly.
In court two days later, I dropped the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction but retained the
action for legal damages. I also acceded to the United States= motion that it be dropped as
Necessary Co-Plaintiff. Judge Stanley Roskowski asked me if Andrei Frolova was in the
courtroom. I replied that he was. The judge invited Andrei to stand up from the audience. With
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the American flag behind him, the judge said simply, AWelcome to the [pg50] United States.@
However, much later, on January 26, 1983, Judge Roskowski filed a brief opinion
dismissing the cause of action in Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of
the act of state doctrine. FN47 He wrote that the Aact of state doctrine operates to preclude United
States courts from ruling on the validity of foreign governmental acts so as not to hinder or
embarrass the Executive Branch in its foreign policy endeavors.@FN48 I immediately filed a
motion for reconsideration, stating that the act of state doctrine needs further examination both as
a general proposition and as applied to Lois=s case. However, Judge Roskowski denied the
motion for reconsideration. I then filed an appeal with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and
on August 15, 1983, I filed a fifty-page brief. Hopefully Lois=s case will provide the Court of
Appeals with a substantial basis for continuing the recent trend away from the unfortunate
decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, FN49 which may some day be viewed as the
Alast gasp@ of the act of state doctrine as an impediment to the realization of the international rule
of law.
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